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A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples

  • Alfredo Salgado-Torres

    ()

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism in market with couples called One Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can be attained in Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast with previous results, we find that the mechanism may attain unstable matchings in SPE. We show that only one special kind of instability is admissible in equilibrium and we argue that this exclusively comes from coordination failures between members of couples. Our main result shows that the One Application Mechanism implements in SPE the set of pairwise stable matchings in markets with couples.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I3-P198.pdf
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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 2044-2055

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00128
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  1. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2010. "Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 273, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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  4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó, 2003. "Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)," Working Papers 78, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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  6. Haeinger, Guillaume & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Decentralized Job Matching," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 688, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, 2008. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-017, Harvard Business School.
  8. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 1996. "Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  9. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
  10. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2005. "Stable matchings and preferences of couples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 75-106, March.
  11. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 604.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 01 Dec 2005.
  12. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura, 2007. "Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 708.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  13. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
  14. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi, 2009. "Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2227-2233, September.
  15. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
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