Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2017.
"Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 222-229.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2016. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Working Papers 894, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2017. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 17.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2016. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 16.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
- Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
- Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 701-720, September.
- Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009.
"Constrained school choice,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2008. "Constrained School Choice," Working Papers 294, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 23, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- repec:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/847 is not listed on IDEAS
- Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2014.
"Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 624-630.
- Matteo Triossi & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2010. "Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 273, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Triossi, Matteo & Romero Medina, Antonio, 2010. "Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1018, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Kucuksenel Serkan, 2011. "Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, September.
- Alcalde, José, 2017. "Beyond the Spanish MIR with Consent: (Hidden) Cooperation and Coordination in Matching," QM&ET Working Papers 17-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
More about this item
Keywordsstable matching; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; direct mechanism; strong equilibrium;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:2:p:241-251. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.