IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v11y2011i1n19.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

Author

Listed:
  • Kucuksenel Serkan

    (Middle East Technical University)

Abstract

This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents’ preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Kucuksenel Serkan, 2011. "Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:19
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1772
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1772
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1935-1704.1772?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
    2. Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
    3. Perez-Castrillo J. David, 1994. "Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 428-440, November.
    4. Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 383-387, December.
    5. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
    6. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May.
    7. Revilla, Pablo, 2007. "Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 7443, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    8. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    9. Pablo Revilla, 2004. "Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/85, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    10. Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December.
    11. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2004. "Implementation in the many-to-many matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-212, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. AyÅŸe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2021. "Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 23(02), pages 1-12, June.
    2. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2019. "Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities Abstract:," Working Papers 2019/03, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023. "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 591-623, February.
    2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 461-474, April.
    3. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2004. "Implementation in the many-to-many matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-212, January.
    4. Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2003. "A Selling Mechanism," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 57(4), October.
    5. Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009. "Constrained school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
    6. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
    7. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
    8. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
    9. Salgado Alfredo, 2018. "Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College Admissions," Working Papers 2018-23, Banco de México.
    10. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.
    11. Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya A., 2008. "Coalitional Matchings," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 37523, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Yasushi Kawase & Keisuke Bando, 2021. "Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 503-546, June.
    13. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 249-270, August.
    14. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May.
    15. Alcalde, José, 2018. "Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 32-49.
    16. Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012. "Let them cheat!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
    17. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
    18. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2017. "Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 222-229.
    19. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2010. "Status-Seeking In Coalitional Matching Problems," Economics Working Papers 10-02, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.