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Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players

Author

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  • Lazarova, Emiliya A.
  • Dimitrov, Dinko

Abstract

We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Lazarova, Emiliya A. & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2010. "Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players," Sustainable Development Papers 96838, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemdp:96838
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.96838
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    Cited by:

    1. Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2013. "Efficiency and stability in a strategic model of hedonic coalitions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(2), pages 131-145, June.
    2. Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya, 2011. "Two-sided coalitional matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 46-54, July.
    3. Takaaki Hamada, 2020. "Implications of the Tradeoff between Inside and Outside Social Status in Group Choice," Papers 2008.10145, arXiv.org.
    4. Sheida Etemadidavan & Andrew J. Collins, 2021. "An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-20, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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