Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan|
Web page: http://www.feem.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2005.
"Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 120(3), pages 963-1002.
- Luttmer, Erzo F. P., 2004. "Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being," Working Paper Series rwp04-029, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2004. "Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being," NBER Working Papers 10667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"Stability and Segregation in Group Formation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 318-346, February.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya, 2011. "Two-sided coalitional matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 46-54, July.
- Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1990. "Fixed Preferences and Changing Tastes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 262-267, May.
- Alp E. Atakan, 2006.
"Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, 05.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001.
"Core in a simple coalition formation game,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Marek Pycia, 2012. "Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 323-362, 01.
- Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996.
"Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Kimura, Toshiyuki, 1992. "Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 511-527, October.
- Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007.
"A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
- Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, Mehmet B., 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 1226, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Federico Echenique & Mehmet B. Yenmez, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Working Papers 2005.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," Game Theory and Information 0506005, EconWPA.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997.
"Assortative Matching and Search,"
97-2b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Tom Truyts, 2010. "Social Status In Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 137-169, 02.
- Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
- Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
- Pablo Revilla, 2004.
"Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2004/85, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982.
"Cores of Partitioning Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dreze, J.H. & Greenberg, J., "undated".
"Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
403, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.122. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.