Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.
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- Romero-Medina, Antonio & Alcalde, J., 1999.
"Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
6124, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May.
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- Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2005.
"Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem,"
Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 153-158, February.
- José Alcalde & Antonio Romero Medina, 1999. "- Sequential Decisions In The College Admissions Problem," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Romero-Medina, Antonio & Alcalde, J., 1999. "Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6126, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2003.
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- Haeinger, Guillaume & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Decentralized Job Matching," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 688, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Decentralized job matching," Working Papers 40, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
- Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
- Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Sebastian Gallegos, 2010. "Public-Private Wage Gap In Latin America (1999-2007): A Matching Approach," Documentos de Trabajo 268, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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