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Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

Author Info

  • Romero-Medina, Antonio
  • Triossi, Matteo

Abstract

This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.

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File URL: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/9275/we1018.pdf?sequence=1
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía in its series UC3M Working papers. Economics with number we1018.

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Date of creation: Sep 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1018
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/

Keywords: Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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  1. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000. "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 294-302, May.
  2. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2011. "Decentralized job matching," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-28, February.
  3. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  4. Triossi, Matteo, 2009. "Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 566-575, May.
  5. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero Medina, 1999. "- Sequential Decisions In The College Admissions Problem," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Marilda Sotomayor, 2003. "Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(2), pages 241-251, December.
  7. Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera & Sebastian Gallegos, 2010. "Public-Private Wage Gap In Latin America (1999-2007): A Matching Approach," Documentos de Trabajo 268, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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Cited by:

  1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria," Documentos de Trabajo 280, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2016. "Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 16.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
  4. B. Evci, 2014. "A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant," Working Papers wp973, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. Alcalde, José, 2016. "(In)visible Hands in Matching Markets," QM&ET Working Papers 16-2, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.

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