Decentralized Job Matching
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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- Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2000.
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- Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998.
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- Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
- Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
- Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
- Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
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