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On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria


  • Joana Pais


We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match- ing, frms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its properties. In particular, different executions of the algorithm may lead to different output matchings. We then study incentives in the rev- elation game induced by the algorithm. We prove that ordinal equilibria always exist. Furthermore, every matching that results from an equilibrium play of the game is stable for a particular preference profile. Namely, if an ordinal equilibrium exists in which firms reveal their true preferences, only matchings that are stable for the true preferences can be obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/11, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
  • Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp112006

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    2. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
    3. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
    4. EHLERS, Lars, 2003. "In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets," Cahiers de recherche 13-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en ├ęconomie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    6. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
    7. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    2. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.

    More about this item


    Matching Markets; Stability; Random Mechanism.;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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