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Random matching in the college admissions problem

  • Joana Pais

    ()

In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilib- rium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we re- late equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0191-6
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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 99-116

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:35:y:2008:i:1:p:99-116
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Web page: http://saet.uiowa.edu/

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

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  1. d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," CORE Discussion Papers 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
  3. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  4. Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116, June.
  5. Joana Pais, 2006. "Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/12, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  6. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, june. pag.
  7. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, 03.
  8. Moulin, HervÈ, 1997. "Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint," Working Papers 97-17, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  9. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
  10. Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/11, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  11. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988, HAL.
  12. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1991. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 31-44, January.
  13. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  14. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  15. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
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