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Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees

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  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude
  • PELEG, Bezalel

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  • d'ASPREMONT, Claude & PELEG, Bezalel, 1988. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," CORE Discussion Papers RP 808, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:808
    Note: In : Social Choice and Welfare, 5, 261-279, 1988
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00433655
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," Working Papers 147, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Alexey I. Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000351, David K. Levine.
    3. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    4. EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi, 2018. "Robust design in monotonic matching markets: a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 2018-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    5. Arunava Sen, 2002. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000090, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Alexey Kushnir, 2009. "Matching Markets with Signals," Working Papers 2009.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    8. Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO, 2018. "Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 04-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    9. Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.

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