Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
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- d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," CORE Discussion Papers 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004.
"Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets,"
147, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 637.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003.
"Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings,"
05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988, HAL.
- Alexey Kushnir, 2009. "Matching Markets with Signals," Working Papers 2009.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
- EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi, 2018.
"Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance,"
Cahiers de recherche
2018-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO, 2018. "Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 04-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Alexey I. Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000351, David K. Levine.
- Arunava Sen, 2002. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000090, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.
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