Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar
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- d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986.
"Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & PELEG, Bezalel, . "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," CORE Discussion Papers RP -808, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- d'ASPREMONT , C. & GERARD VARET, L.-A., .
"Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-481, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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