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Implementation via mechanisms with transfers

  • Yi, Jianxin

We consider the following problem: suppose that the social choice rule is given, but the planner has the opportunity to redistribute among agents some numeraire commodity ("money") by compensatory transfers; can the planner find a transfer such that the social choice rule is Nash implementable by the transfer? In this paper, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation by transfers. Furthermore, we construct a simplified mechanism, which Nash-implements the desired social choice rule by transfers.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 61 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 65-70

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:61:y:2011:i:1:p:65-70
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
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  13. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  14. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1109-1132, 07.
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