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Epsilon-Nash implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Barlo, Mehmet
  • Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun

Abstract

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun, 2009. "Epsilon-Nash implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 36-38, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:1:p:36-38
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
    3. Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
    4. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 331-339, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl, 2017. "Finite Horizon Holdup and How to Cross the River," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168136, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Yi, Jianxin, 2011. "Implementation via mechanisms with transfers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 65-70, January.

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