We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to lotteries and may depend on factors other than agents' preferences. We assume that agents are not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a lexicographical way. We define iterative honesty-proofness by iteratively removing messages dominated by more honest messages. We show that in the complete information environments with small fines, every social choice function is implementable in iterative honesty-proofness. This is in contrast with the standard implementation model, because any 'normative' social choice function depending on non-preference factors is never implementable when agents are not influenced by factors other than pure self-interest. We extend this result to the incomplete information environments with quasi-linearity and with correlated private signals. Next, we assume that it is costly for each agent to report dishonestly and this cost may be close to zero. We show that in the incomplete information environments, every incentive compatible social choice function can be implemented by the mechanism that is universal in the sense that it does not depend on the private signal structure.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cabrales, Antonio, 1999.
"Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 159-184, June.
- Antonio Cabrales, 1996. "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers 179, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Antonio Cabrales, . "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," ELSE working papers 009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, . "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994.
"Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- M. Rabin, 2001.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
511, David K. Levine.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- Maskin, Eric, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
- Ingela Brundin & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1998.
"Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion,"
0089, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ingela Alger & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2001. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 496, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Ingela Alger, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion," FMG Discussion Papers dp318, Financial Markets Group.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 1977.
"Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209, June.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, . "Equity and the informational basis of collective choice," CORE Discussion Papers RP -350, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
- Matthew Rabin., 1997.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Economics Working Papers
97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
- Deschamps, Robert & Gevers, Louis, 1978. "Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 143-163, April.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
- Matsushima Hitoshi, 1993. "Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf178. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.