Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria
In this paper, we give a sufficient condition for double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we discuss the mechanism with transfers and prove that some important social choice rules are doubly implemented in Nash and M-Nash equilibria by the mechanism with transfers.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
- Sang-Chul Suh, 1997. "Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 439-447.
- Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November.
- Tomas Sjöstrω, 1996. "Credibility And Renegotiation Of Outcome Functions In Implementation," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 157-169, 06.
- Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 409-428.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Yi, Jianxin, 2011. "Implementation via mechanisms with transfers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 65-70, January.
- Peter Fristrup & Hans Keiding, 2001. "Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 213-226.
- Sang-Chul Suh, 1996. "An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 109-122.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:105-107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.