Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly
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References listed on IDEAS
- L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
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More about this item
KeywordsLimit orders; double auction; Nash equilibria; Walras equilibria; perfect competition; bilateral monopoly; mechanism design;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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