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Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets

  • Michael Waldman

Markets for durable goods constitute an important part of the economy. In this paper I first briefly review the microeconomic theory literature on durable-goods markets, focusing mostly on the last ten years. I then discuss a number of my own recent analyses concerning optimal antitrust policy in durable-goods markets that mostly build on ideas in the larger literature. Specific topics covered include: (i) optimal antitrust policy for durable-goods mergers; (ii) practices that eliminate secondhand markets; (iii) tying in markets characterized by upgrades and switching costs; and (iv) antitrust policy for aftermarket monopolization in durable-goods markets.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2004/wp-cesifo-2004-10/cesifo1_wp1306.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1306.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1306
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