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United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits

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  • Masten, Scott E
  • Snyder, Edward A

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  • Masten, Scott E & Snyder, Edward A, 1993. "United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 33-70, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:36:y:1993:i:1:p:33-70
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467264
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    2. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    3. Arifovic, Jasmina & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2010. "Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 1967-1992, October.
    4. Arrunada, Benito & Garicano, Luis & Vazquez, Luis, 2001. "Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 257-284, April.
    5. Gillian Hadfield, "undated". "Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1003, University of Southern California Law School.
    6. David de Meza & Marianno Selvaggi, 2003. "Please Hold me Up: Why Firms Grant Exclusive Dealing Contracts," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/066, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    7. Benito Arrunada, 2000. "The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers : An Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation with Suppliers," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 277-296.
    8. Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis, 2001. "Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Felippe Cauê Serigati & Paulo Furquim De Azevedo, 2016. "How To Indirectly Measure Market Transaction Costs," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42ndd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 192, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    10. Arruñada Benito & Andonova Veneta, 2008. "Judges' Cognition and Market Order," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 665-692, December.
    11. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2005. "Does antitrust policy improve consumer welfare? Assessing the evidence," Chapters,in: Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Chia-Wen Chen & Shiou Shieh, 2016. "Does Exclusive Dealing Matter? Evidence from Distribution Contract Changes in The U.S. Beer Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 411-435, September.
    13. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
    14. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
    15. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Jill Boylston Herndon, 2000. "United Shoe Machineryand the Antitrust Significance of “Free” Service," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(3), pages 301-311, November.
    17. Michael Waldman, 2004. "Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1306, CESifo Group Munich.
    18. Benito Arruñada, 2000. "The role of institutions in the contractual process," Economics Working Papers 521, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2003.
    19. Guy Meunier, 2011. "Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from Theoretical Models," Chapters,in: Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Waldman, Michael, 1997. "Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 61-92, April.
    21. David Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2007. "Exclusive contracts foster relationship-specific investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 85-97, March.
    22. Ravi Mantena & Ramesh Sankaranarayanan & Siva Viswanathan, 2007. "“Exclusive Licensing in Complementary Network Industries”," Working Papers 07-04, NET Institute, revised Apr 2007.
    23. Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 2015. "Rigidity of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 21186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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