The optimal suppression of a low-cost technology by a durable-good monopoly
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- Larry S. Karp & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 1996. "The Optimal Suppression of a Low-Cost Technology by a Durable-Good Monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 346-364, Summer.
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- Yang, Liu & Wang, Yonggui & Ma, Jun & Ng, Chi To & Cheng, T.C.E., 2014. "Technology investment under flexible capacity strategy with demand uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 190-197.
- Gerstle, Ari D. & Waldman, Michael, 2016.
"Mergers in durable-goods industries: A re-examination of market power and welfare effects,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 677-692.
- Ari Gerstle & Michael Waldman, "undated". "Mergers In Durable-Goods Industries: A Re-Examination Of Market Power And Welfare Effects," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1038, American Law & Economics Association.
- Ramesh Sankaranarayanan, 2007. "Innovation and the Durable Goods Monopolist: The Optimality of Frequent New-Version Releases," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 774-791, 11-12.
- Amagoia Sagasta & José M. Usategui, 2015. "Purchase and rental subsidies in durable-oligopolies," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 213(2), pages 11-40, June.
- Ding, Yucheng, 2014. "Why Branded Firm may Benefit from Counterfeit Competition," MPRA Paper 52933, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Waldman, Michael, 1997. "Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 61-92, April.
- Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
- Justin P. Johnson & Henry S. Schneider & Michael Waldman, 2014. "The Role and Growth of New-Car Leasing: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 665-698.
- Justin P. Johnson & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Leasing, Lemons, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 307-328, May.
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Keywordscoase conjecture; consumers; monopolies; profits; technology;
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