IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/harver/1803.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks

Author

Listed:
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Jean Tirole

Abstract

This paper studies the monopoly pricing of overlapping generations of a durable good. We focus on two sorts of goods: those with an active second-hand market and anonymous consumers, such as textbooks, and gods such as software, where there is no second-hand market and consumers are "semi-anonymous," meaning that they can prove that they purchased the old version to qualify for a discount on the new one. In the former case, we find that the sales of the new goods are independent of the existing stock of the old one if the monopolist chooses either to produce or repurchase the old good after the new one becomes available, but that this separation does not hold when the monopolist chooses to be inactive on teh old-good market. Moreover, we identify parameter regions where each of these three possibilities will occur. In the "semi-anonymous" case, we find that if the new good is a sufficiently large improvement the semi-anonymity constraint binds, in that the monopolist would prefer to charge a higher price for upgrades than for sales to new consumers. If the new good is a smaller improvement, then upgrade discounts are optimal, and the outcome is the same as if the monopolist knew exactly which consumers had purchased in the first period. If in addition both goods are essentially costless, then all consumers who purchase the old good upgrade when the new one becomes available. If the old good is costless but the new good is not, and the discount factor is low, there can be "leapfrogging" in that some low-valuation consumers will purchase the new good even though some high-valuation ones purchased the old good at the start and do not upgrade.

Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1803, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1803
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/fth/harver/19971803.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John A. Norton & Frank M. Bass, 1987. "A Diffusion Theory Model of Adoption and Substitution for Successive Generations of High-Technology Products," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1069-1086.
    2. Daniel A. Levinthal & Devavrat Purohit, 1989. "Durable Goods and Product Obsolescence," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 35-56.
    3. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    4. Choi, Jay Pil, 1994. "Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 167-182, June.
    5. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    6. Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1995. "Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 771-792.
    7. Thum, Marcel, 1994. "Network externalities, technological progress, and the competition of market contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 269-289, June.
    8. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-332, April.
    9. Lee, I.H. & Lee, J., 1994. "Durable goods monopoly under technological innovation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9413, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    10. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
    11. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, June.
    12. Devavrat Purohit, 1994. "What Should You Do When Your Competitors Send in the Clones?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(4), pages 392-411.
    13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    14. Michael Waldman, 1993. "A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 273-283.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Another Perspective on Planned obsolescence: is there really too much Innovation?," Industrial Organization 0302001, EconWPA.
    2. Li, Kate J. & Xu, Susan H., 2015. "The comparison between trade-in and leasing of a product with technology innovations," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 134-146.
    3. Gerstle, Ari D. & Waldman, Michael, 2016. "Mergers in durable-goods industries: A re-examination of market power and welfare effects," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 677-692.
    4. Huang, Jian & Leng, Mingming & Liang, Liping & Luo, Chunlin, 2014. "Qualifying for a government’s scrappage program to stimulate consumers’ trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(2), pages 363-376.
    5. Xiao, Yongbo, 2017. "Choosing the right exchange-old-for-new programs for durable goods with a rollover," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 259(2), pages 512-526.
    6. William Caylor, 2016. "Credible Signals Of The Release Of New Versions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 862-878, April.
    7. Anton, James J. & Biglaiser, Gary, 2013. "Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1179-1212.
    8. Eric Brouillat, 2015. "Live fast, die young? Investigating product life spans and obsolescence in an agent-based model," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 447-473, April.
    9. Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2008. "Who Benefits From Online Privacy?," Working Papers 08-26, NET Institute.
    10. Steven J. Davis & Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, 2001. "Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms," NBER Working Papers 8411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Taylor, Curtis & Wagman, Liad, 2014. "Consumer privacy in oligopolistic markets: Winners, losers, and welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 80-84.
    12. Major, Iván, 2008. "Információmegosztás a bankok között. Mikor jó a teljes lista?
      [Sharing of information among banks. When is full-list a good thing?]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 763-781.
    13. Qiu_Hong Wang & Kai-Lung Hui, 2005. "Technology Timing and Pricing In the Presence of an Installed Base," Industrial Organization 0512013, EconWPA.
    14. Kai-Lung Hui & Qiu-Hong Wang, 2005. "Delayed Product Introduction," Industrial Organization 0503011, EconWPA.
    15. Ivan Major, 2013. "Information Sharing Among Banks About Borrowers: What Type Would They Support?," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1316, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    16. Souza, Eduardo Correia de & Batista, Jorge Chami, 2014. "Replacement Cycles, Income Distribution, and Dynamic Price Discrimination," Insper Working Papers wpe_331, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    17. Awrey, Dan, 2013. "Toward a supply-side theory of financial innovation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 401-419.
    18. Jin-Hyuk Kim, 2008. "Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying," Working Papers 08-05, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
    19. Cerquera Dussán, Daniel, 2007. "Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-086, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    20. Xiong, Yu & Zhao, Pei & Xiong, Zhongkai & Li, Gendao, 2016. "The impact of product upgrading on the decision of entrance to a secondary market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(2), pages 443-454.
    21. Jia, Junxiu & Zhang, Jiang, 2013. "Dynamic ordering and pricing strategies in a two-tier multi-generation durable goods supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-142.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1803. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ieharus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.