Screening by Mode of Trade
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan Beccuti, 2020. "On the Optimality of Price-posting in Rental Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp2007, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
More about this item
KeywordsDurable goods; Dynamic mechanism design; Coase problem; Ratchet effect; Screening;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2019-12-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DES-2019-12-16 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2019-12-16 (Microeconomics)
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