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Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation‐Proof Contracts


  • Bruno Strulovici


What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation‐proof contracts in this environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods. As frictions become negligible, all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating, efficient, and straightforward to characterize.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Strulovici, 2017. "Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation‐Proof Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 585-616, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:585-616

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    Cited by:

    1. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract Design With Limited Commitment," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168269, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Papers 2005.05713,, revised Sep 2020.
    3. Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019. "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften dp1908, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Graz Economics Papers 2019-10, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    5. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019. "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper 100885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018. "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 95-117.
    7. Gerardi, Dino, 2018. "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers 12699, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456,, revised Aug 2020.
    9. Feng, Zhuo & Zhang, Yiwen & Zhang, Shuibo & Song, Jinbo, 2018. "Contracting and renegotiating with a loss-averse private firm in BOT road projects," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 40-72.
    10. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi & Weijie Zhong, 2019. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 876-910, March.
    11. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579,, revised Aug 2020.

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