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Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist

Author

Listed:
  • John Conlisk
  • Eitan Gerstner
  • Joel Sobel

Abstract

In the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination. A new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period, interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay. Within each cohort, consumers vary in their tastes for the good. Under broad conditions, the seller will vary the price over time. In most periods, he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay. Periodically, however, he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay.

Suggested Citation

  • John Conlisk & Eitan Gerstner & Joel Sobel, 1984. "Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 489-505.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:99:y:1984:i:3:p:489-505.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1885961
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