IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments

  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically rational agents and partially honest agents coexist. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one partially honest agent in either the weak notion or the strong notion, the class of efficient social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable by such mechanisms is characterized. Secondly, the (unconstrained) Walrasian correspondence is shown to be implementable by such a mechanism when there is at least one partially honest agent of the strong type, which may provide a behavioral foundation for decentralized implementation of the Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, in this set-up, the effects of honesty on the implementation of more equitable Pareto optimal allocations can be viewed as negligible.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48294/1/MPRA_paper_48294.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48294.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48294
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany

Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2459
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-992459
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
  2. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November.
  3. Amartya Sen, 1996. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1766, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
  5. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Implementation with Evidence," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754592, HAL.
  6. Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
  7. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
  8. William Thomson, 1984. "The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 447-460.
  9. Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2001. "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 423-436, December.
  10. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  11. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  12. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
  13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  14. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
  15. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Walrasian Economics in Retrospect," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1411-1439.
  16. Andrew Postlewaite & David Wettstein, 1989. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 603-611.
  17. Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
  18. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013. "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 131-151, September.
  19. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  20. L. Hurwicz, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 217-225.
  21. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
  22. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
  23. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
  24. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-64, May.
  25. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  26. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
  27. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 1995. "A Decent Proposal," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  29. Otani, Yoshihiko & Sicilian, Joseph, 1982. "Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-68, June.
  30. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.