Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism
By allowing for the possibility that individuals recognize the intrinsic value of choice along with the instrumental value thereof, we suppose that individuals express extended preference orderings of the following type: Choosing an alternative x from an opportunity set A is better than choosing an alternative y from an opportunity set B. Within this framework, we identify a consequentialist and a non-consequentialist, who show contrasting attitudes toward alternatives vis-爿vis opportunities. This paper characterizes these attitudes in terms of some axioms, whereas the companion paper explores the implications of these concepts in the context of social choice theory la Arrow.
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