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Extensions of the Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Non-welfaristic Framework




In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstrating that the market mechanism also promotes individual freedom efficiently. This paper has a two-fold purpose. First, in order to investigate extensions of the first and the second welfare theorems, we present an analytical framework in which each agent is endowed with three types of preference relations: an allocation preference relation, an opportunity preference relation, and an overall preference relation. We demonstrate that under certain conditions, the two welfare theorems can be extended. Second, we describe the restrictive nature of the underlying conditions for these positive results.

Suggested Citation

  • Tadenuma, Koichi & Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "Extensions of the Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Non-welfaristic Framework," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 53(1), pages 107-120, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:53:y:2012:i:1:p:107-120

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Tadenuma, Koichi & Xu, Yongsheng, 2010. "The Walrasian Distribution of Opportunity Sets : An Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Papers 2010-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. N. Gravel & J.-F. Laslier & A. Trannoy, 1996. "Individual freedom of choice in a social setting," THEMA Working Papers 96-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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    More about this item


    fundamental welfare theorems; market mechanism; freedom; opportunity set; Pareto optimality;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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