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Macrojustice : distribution, impôts et transferts optimaux

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  • Serge-Christophe Kolm

    () (Idep)

Abstract

Les transferts et la redistribution publics créent une part importante de la distribution du revenu et sont un sujet majeur de la politique et de l’éthique sociale, et donc de l’économie publique et de l’économie normative. Le critère d’unanimité des jugements bien considérés (choix social endogène) montre ce que doit être la solution. La justice distributive globale dans la macrojustice montre ainsi l’allocation nécessaire des principales ressources résultant des droits de base (liberté sociale) et de l’efficacité (de Pareto). Elle concerne la réallocation des valeurs des capacités productives des personnes. Le résultat revient à une égalisation des revenus des personnes pour le même “travail d’égalisation”, ou à ce que chacun cède à chaque autre le produit du même travail. Ce “travail d’égalisation” notionnel est un degré de redistribution, d’égalisation, de solidarité, de communauté patrimoniale et de réciprocité, et aussi un revenu minimum de fait comme fraction du revenu moyen. Les méthodes générales du choix social endogène le déterminent.

Suggested Citation

  • Serge-Christophe Kolm, 2003. "Macrojustice : distribution, impôts et transferts optimaux," IDEP Working Papers 0305, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
  • Handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:0305
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