Ethical Implementation and the Creation of Moral Values
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, we propose a coherent model of implementation of ethical norms that we believe is both compatible with the rigorous decision analysis of game theory and with the well-established tradition of ethics in moral philosophy and argue that this kind of models must be considered and complement the existing implementation theory. Furthermore, we explore the model from a normative and axiomatic viewpoint and prove that a complete and ''coherent'' ethical system under our assumptions cannot be founded in any of these two simple moral maxima: the first entails the “moral punishment of induction” (inducing somebody to desire to do something wrong) and the second, called ''respecting reciprocity'' is an operative version of the “golden rule”: do not do others what you would not like to be done.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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