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Ethical Implementation and the Creation of Moral Values

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, we propose a coherent model of implementation of ethical norms that we believe is both compatible with the rigorous decision analysis of game theory and with the well-established tradition of ethics in moral philosophy and argue that this kind of models must be considered and complement the existing implementation theory. Furthermore, we explore the model from a normative and axiomatic viewpoint and prove that a complete and ''coherent'' ethical system under our assumptions cannot be founded in any of these two simple moral maxima: the first entails the “moral punishment of induction” (inducing somebody to desire to do something wrong) and the second, called ''respecting reciprocity'' is an operative version of the “golden rule”: do not do others what you would not like to be done.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2003/25.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_25
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  1. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  2. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
  3. Binmore, Ken & McCarthy, John & Ponti, Giovanni & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 2002. "A Backward Induction Experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 48-88, May.
  4. Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000. "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper 3, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Kotaro Suzumura, 1999. "Consequences, opportunities, and procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 17-40.
  6. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
  7. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  9. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2001. "Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System," NBER Working Papers 8688, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July.
  11. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  12. Hammond, P.J. & , ., 1987. "Consequentialist foundations for expected utility," CORE Discussion Papers 1987016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
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