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Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

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  • Walter Trockel

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics , Bielefeld University, Universitätsstrasse 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany)

Abstract

The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43
    Note: Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002
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    Cited by:

    1. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.
    2. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    3. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Kang Rong, 2018. "Fair Allocation When Players' Preferences Are Unknown," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 497-509, January.
    5. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2020. "Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 60-67.
    6. Radim Valenčík & Petr Mach & Ondřej Černík, 2025. "The Economics Of Productive Consumption And Positional Investing," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 19(1), pages 1-17.
    7. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
    8. Y. H. Gu & M. Goh & Q. L. Chen & R. D. Souza & G. C. Tang, 2013. "A new two-party bargaining mechanism," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 135-163, January.
    9. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
    11. Peter Borm & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2020. "The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 67-85, November.
    12. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
    13. Trockel, Walter, 2011. "An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 77-83, January.
    14. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    15. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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