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Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

  • Walter Trockel

    ()

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics , Bielefeld University, Universitätsstrasse 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany)

The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 27-43

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43
Note: Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm

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  1. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  3. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  4. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  5. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Economics Series 25, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  6. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  8. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 301, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  9. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  10. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  12. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  13. van Damme, E.E.C., 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Other publications TiSEM b408f4e4-5094-48a1-a02f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  14. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  15. Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Working Papers 310, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  16. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  17. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154426 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. E. Maskin, 1983. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey," Working papers 333, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  19. Border, K.C. & Segal, U., 1995. "Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9518, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  20. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
  21. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  22. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  23. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  24. Border, Kim C. & Segal, Uzi, 1995. "Preferences Over Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Working Papers 923, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  25. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  26. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  27. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  28. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
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