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On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution

  • Trockel,W.

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 306.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:306
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  1. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  2. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
  3. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Economics Series 25, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  4. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  5. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  7. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  8. Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
  10. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
  11. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  12. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  14. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  16. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  17. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  18. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 301, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  19. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
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