Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.
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