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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

  • Luis Corchón
  • Matteo Triossi

    ()

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.

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File URL: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/~cea/sitedev/cea/www/download.php?file=documentos_trabajo/ASOCFILE120081224005211.pdf
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Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 255.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:255
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/cea/

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  1. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  5. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 401-17, May.
  7. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  9. Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi, 1995. "On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 222-233, May.
  10. Silvestre, Joaquim, 1982. "Fixprice analysis in exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 28-58, February.
  11. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.
  12. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  13. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  14. Grandmont, Jean-Michel & Laroque, Guy, 1976. "On Temporary Keynesian Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 53-67, February.
  15. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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