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Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

  • Luis C. Corchon

    ()

  • Matteo Triosi

    ()

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we057136.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we057136
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  1. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Nash program," Working Papers 2007-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  2. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
  3. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  4. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Lu Hong, 1996. "Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 433-444.
  7. Tian, Guoqiang, 1991. "Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism," MPRA Paper 41255, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  10. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
  11. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Benassy Jean-pascal, 1984. "On competitive market mechanism," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8407, CEPREMAP.
  13. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Jungle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 883-896, 07.
  14. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1998. "Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 366, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  15. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  16. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  17. Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 401-17, May.
  18. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
  19. Silvestre, Joaquim, 1982. "Fixprice analysis in exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 28-58, February.
  20. Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi, 1995. "On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 222-233, May.
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