Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
This paper considers the problem of implementation for exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets. Agents are assumed to have private information about their endowments. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules that are Bayesian implementable by feasible mechanisms for such an environment. We compare our main result to the Nash implementation result derived in an environment of complete information.
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Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Note:||Received: 30 September 1994/Accepted: 16 May 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
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