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On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution

  • Walter Trockel

    (UCLA)

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp788.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 788.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:788
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  2. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  3. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  5. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
  8. Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
  9. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  10. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  11. Claus-Jochen Haake, 1998. "Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 301, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  12. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Walter Trockel, 1995. "An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies," Working Papers 245, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  14. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  15. van Damme, E.E.C., 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Other publications TiSEM b408f4e4-5094-48a1-a02f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  16. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.
  17. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  18. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
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