Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?
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|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
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- Eric van Damme, 1984.
"The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal,"
597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
- Trockel, Walter, 1996. "A Walrasian approach to bargaining games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 295-301, June.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
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Economic theory and game theory
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- Serrano, Roberto, 1997.
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Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
- Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Yildiz, Muhamet, 2003.
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 465-487, November.
- Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999.
1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 310, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Walter Trockel, 1999.
"Unique Nash Implementation For A Class Of Bargaining Solutions,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 267-272.
- Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
- Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
- Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
- Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
- Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg, 1999. "A note on van Damme's mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 179-187.
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