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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

  • Trockel, Walter

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two-person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1991) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form game GS,d is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S, d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the Raiffa solution and accepting it in the first stage of the game. By a modification of GS,d the analogous result is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. These results immediately extend to implementation of a sequential Raiffa (solution based) social choice rule in subgame perfect equilibrium.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 77-83

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:77-83
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
  2. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Economics Series 2012_7, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  4. Walter Trockel, 2009. "An axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution," Working Papers 425, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, FundaciĆ³n SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  6. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  7. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  8. Walter Trockel, 2002. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 27-43.
  9. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  10. Emily Tanimura & Sylvie Thoron, 2008. "A mechanism for solving bargaining problems between risk averse players," Working Papers halshs-00325695, HAL.
  11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  12. Salonen, Hannu, 1988. "Decomposable solutions for N -- person bargaining games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 333-347.
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