A mechanism for solving bargaining problems between risk averse players
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eric Guerci & Sylvie Thoron, 2011. "Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms," Working Papers halshs-00584328, HAL.
- Trockel, Walter, 2011.
"An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 77-83, January.
- Trockel, Walter, 2011. "An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 426, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- repec:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0046-4 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0567-9 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsbargaining theory; Raiffa bargaining solution; risk aversion; final offers arbitration; chilling effect; gradualism;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-07 (All new papers)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00325695. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .