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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

  • Walter Trockel

    ()

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form game G^{S,d} is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S, d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the Raiffa solution and accepting it in the first stage of the game. By a modification of G^{S,d} the analogous result is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation of a sequential Raiffa (solution based) social choice rule in subgame perfect equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-426.pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 426.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:426
Contact details of provider: Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
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  1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  5. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
  6. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
  7. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  8. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  9. Emily Tanimura & Sylvie Thoron, 2008. "A mechanism for solving bargaining problems between risk averse players," Working Papers halshs-00325695, HAL.
  10. Salonen, Hannu, 1988. "Decomposable solutions for N -- person bargaining games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 333-347.
  11. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  12. Walter Trockel, 2009. "An axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution," Working Papers 425, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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