On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by de.ning a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even su.cient for Nash implementability.
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Volume (Year): 14 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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