Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies
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- Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 306, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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