Generalized Raiffa solutions
We define a family of solutions for n-person bargaining problems which generalizes the discrete Raiffa solution and approaches the continuous Raiffa solution. Each member of this family is a stepwise solution, which is a pair of functions: a step-function that determines a new disagreement point for a given bargaining problem, and a solution function that assigns the solution to the problem. We axiomatically characterize stepwise solutions of the family of generalized Raiffa solutions, using standard axioms of bargaining theory.
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Game Theory and Information
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