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An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution

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  • Geoffroy Clippel

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  • Geoffroy Clippel, 2007. "An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 201-210, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:201-210
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0201-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    2. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September.
    3. Hans Peters & Eric Van Damme, 1991. "Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(3), pages 447-461, August.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Chun, Youngsub, 1990. "Minimal cooperation in bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 311-316, December.
    6. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
    7. Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002. "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2014. "Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 173-177, February.
    3. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
    4. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(4), pages 691-696, November.
    5. Sigbjørn Birkeland & Bertil Tungodden, 2014. "Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 125-151, June.
    6. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Working Papers WP2012/1, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
    7. repec:spr:annopr:v:251:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-015-1894-5 is not listed on IDEAS

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