An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution
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- Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013.
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- Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2009. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Economics Series 2009_14, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions," Economics Series 2012_7, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2014. "Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 173-177.
- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015.
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- Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2011. "A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(4), pages 691-696, November.
- Sigbjørn Birkeland & Bertil Tungodden, 2014. "Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 125-151.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Working Papers WP2012/1, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
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