A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Note:||Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001|
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References listed on IDEAS
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