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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

  • Eyal Winter

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel)

  • Oscar Volij

    ()

    (Department of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA)

  • Nir Dagan

    ()

    (Academic Priority Ltd., Rashi 31, 52015 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 811-823

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:811-823
Note: Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 6 September 2001
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  1. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  3. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/16, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998.
  5. Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 45-53.
  6. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  7. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Chun, Y. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Nash Solution And Uncertain Disagreement Points," RCER Working Papers 134, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  10. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  11. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
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