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Nir Dagan

Personal Details

First Name:Nir
Middle Name:
Last Name:Dagan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pda6
http://www.nirdagan.com
Terminal Degree:1995 Department of Economics; Hebrew University of Jerusalem (from RePEc Genealogy)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Nir Dagan, 2008. "An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy," Economic theory and game theory 020, Nir Dagan.
  2. Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan.
  3. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5259, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Discussion Paper Series dp265, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 2000. "Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5201, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.
  9. Nir Dagan, 1998. "A Critique on the Theory of Linear Price Monopoly," Economic theory and game theory 016, Nir Dagan, revised 25 Sep 1998.
  10. Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5099, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998. "Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"," Economic theory and game theory 007, Nir Dagan.
  12. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  13. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1997. "Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5141, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  14. Nir Dagan, 1996. "Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence," Economic theory and game theory 012, Nir Dagan.
  15. Nir Dagan, 1996. "Recontracting and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 013, Nir Dagan, revised Jun 1996.
  16. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  17. Nir Dagan, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Economic theory and game theory 003, Nir Dagan.
  18. Nir Dagan, 1995. "Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions," Economic theory and game theory 015, Nir Dagan, revised Jan 1999.
  19. Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Economic theory and game theory 011, Nir Dagan.
  20. Nir Dagan, 1994. "On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation," Economic theory and game theory 008, Nir Dagan, revised Feb 2008.
  21. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002. "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.
  2. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Bargaining, coalitions and competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 279-296, March.
  3. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 2000. " Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-181.
  4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.
  5. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998. "Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(5), pages 1231-1233, September.
  6. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.
  7. Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 1997. "Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(1), pages 11-25.
  8. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.
  9. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  10. Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.
  11. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993. "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.

More information

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 20 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (8) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 2001-07-13. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
  4. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
  5. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
  6. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
  7. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-05-26
  8. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 1998-09-14

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