# Nir Dagan

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## Personal Details

First Name: | Nir |

Middle Name: | |

Last Name: | Dagan |

Suffix: | |

RePEc Short-ID: | pda6 |

Email: | |

Homepage: | http://www.nirdagan.com |

Postal Address: | |

Phone: |

- Nir Dagan, 2008.
"
**An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy**," Economic theory and game theory 020, Nir Dagan. - Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005.
"
**Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy**," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Staff General Research Papers 5259, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002.
"
**A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Economic theory and game theory 013, Oscar Volij. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000.

- Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002.
"
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
**The Time-Preference Nash Solution**," Discussion Paper Series dp265, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
**The Time-Preference Nash Solution**," Economic theory and game theory 014, Oscar Volij. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
**The time-preference Nash solution**," Economic theory and game theory 019, Nir Dagan.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 2000.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World**," Staff General Research Papers 5201, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 2000.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World**," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-81.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World**," Economic theory and game theory 010, Nir Dagan, revised Aug 1999. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World**," Economic theory and game theory 002, Oscar Volij, revised Aug 1999.

- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 2000.
"
- Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition**," Staff General Research Papers 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"
**Bargaining, coalitions and competition**," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 279-296, 03.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition**," Economic theory and game theory 014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, coalitions and competition**," Economics Working Papers 178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition**," Economic theory and game theory 003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"
- Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 1998.
"
**Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein**," Staff General Research Papers 5099, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
**Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"**," Economic theory and game theory 007, Nir Dagan.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
**Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(5), pages 1231-1233, September.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, .
"
**Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"**," Economic theory and game theory 001, Oscar Volij.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1998.
"
**A Critique on the Theory of Linear Price Monopoly**," Economic theory and game theory 016, Nir Dagan, revised 25 Sep 1998. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
"
**Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games**," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998.
"
**Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games**," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997.
"
**Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games**," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998.
"
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1997.
"
**A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Staff General Research Papers 5130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997.
"
**A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997.
"
**A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Economic theory and game theory 005, Nir Dagan.

- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997.
"
- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," Staff General Research Papers 5141, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 11-25.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," Economic theory and game theory 004, Nir Dagan.

- Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 1997.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**Recontracting and Competition**," Economic theory and game theory 013, Nir Dagan, revised Jun 1996.- Nir Dagan, 1994.
"
**Recontracting and competition**," Economics Working Papers 152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996.

- Nir Dagan, 1994.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence**," Economic theory and game theory 012, Nir Dagan.- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence**," Economics Working Papers 151, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules**," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.

- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule**," Economic theory and game theory 003, Nir Dagan.- Dagan, Nir, 1996.
"
**A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.

- Dagan, Nir, 1996.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1995.
"
**Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions**," Economic theory and game theory 015, Nir Dagan, revised Jan 1999. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Working Papers 95-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999.
"
**Feasible implementation of taxation methods**," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Staff General Research Papers 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1995.
"
**Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism**," Economic theory and game theory 011, Nir Dagan.- Nir Dagan, 1995.
"
**Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism**," Economics Working Papers 141, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

- Nir Dagan, 1995.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1994.
"
**On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation**," Economic theory and game theory 008, Nir Dagan, revised Feb 2008. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993.
"
**The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach**," Staff General Research Papers 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993.
"
**The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993.
"
**The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach**," Economic theory and game theory 001, Nir Dagan.

RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199411 is not listed on IDEAS

RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199423 is not listed on IDEAS - Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993.
"

- Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002.
"
**A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Economic theory and game theory 013, Oscar Volij. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2000.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Economic theory and game theory 018, Nir Dagan, revised 21 Sep 2000. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"
**A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution**," Staff General Research Papers 5259, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001.
"
- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 2000.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World**," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-81.- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World**," Economic theory and game theory 002, Oscar Volij, revised Aug 1999. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World**," Economic theory and game theory 010, Nir Dagan, revised Aug 1999. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 2000.
"
**Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World**," Staff General Research Papers 5201, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"
**Bargaining, coalitions and competition**," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 279-296, 03.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition**," Economic theory and game theory 014, Nir Dagan, revised May 1999. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, coalitions and competition**," Economics Working Papers 178, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. - Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition**," Staff General Research Papers 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
**Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition**," Economic theory and game theory 003, Oscar Volij, revised Jul 1998.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1996.
"
- Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999.
"
**Feasible implementation of taxation methods**," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Staff General Research Papers 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1995.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Working Papers 95-14, Brown University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999.
"
**Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods**," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan.

- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999.
"
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
**Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'**," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(5), pages 1231-1233, September.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
**Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"**," Economic theory and game theory 007, Nir Dagan. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, .
"

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998.
"
- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998.
"
**Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games**," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997.
"
**Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games**," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. - Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998.
"
**Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games**," Economic theory and game theory 006, Nir Dagan.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997.
"
- Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997.
"
**A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997.
"
**A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Economic theory and game theory 005, Nir Dagan. - Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1997.
"
**A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules**," Staff General Research Papers 5130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997.
"
- Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 11-25.- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," Staff General Research Papers 5141, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1997.
"
**Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems**," Economic theory and game theory 004, Nir Dagan.

- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1997.
"
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules**," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules**," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.

- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
- Dagan, Nir, 1996.
"
**A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule**," Economic theory and game theory 003, Nir Dagan.

- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993.
"
**The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993.
"
**The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach**," Staff General Research Papers 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. - Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 1993.
"
**The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach**," Economic theory and game theory 001, Nir Dagan.

- Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993.
"

20 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):

- NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-05-26
- NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
- NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (8) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 2001-07-13. Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
- NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14
- NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 1998-09-14
- NEP-PUB: Public Finance (2) 1998-09-14 1998-09-14

#### Most cited item

- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"
**New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules**," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.

#### Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

- Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993.
"
**The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach**," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.

#### Access and download statistics for all items

#### Co-authorship network on CollEc

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