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Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods

Author

Listed:
  • Volij, Oscar
  • Dagan, Nir
  • Serrano, Roberto

Abstract

This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two mechanisms. The first one, which requires complete information, implements every taxation method in Nash, strong and coalition-proof equilibrium. The second, where informational requirements are relaxed, implements a large class of consistent and monotone methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by the general theory. Under fully private information no method is implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5246, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5246
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    Cited by:

    1. Byungchae Rhee, 2008. "A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 619-653, May.
    2. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
    3. Ignacio García-Jurado & Julio González-Díaz & Antonio Villar, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-197, September.
    4. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Biung†Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno†Ternero, 2017. "Fair Allocation Of Disputed Properties," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1279-1301, November.
    6. Li, Jiawen & Ju, Yuan, 2023. "Divide and choose: An informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    7. Byungchae Rhee, 2004. "A Characterization of Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
    8. Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 179-198, February.
    9. Nasrollahi Shahri, Nima, 2010. "The Effectiveness of international investment instruments on the amount of foreign investment (a case study of Iran)," MPRA Paper 36317, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Corchón, Luis C. & Triossi, Matteo, 2005. "Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057136, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    12. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    13. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    14. M. Albizuri & J. Echarri & J. Zarzuelo, 2015. "A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 1-11, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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