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Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey

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  • Thomson, William

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 45 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 249-297

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:249-297
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, "undated". "The TAL-family or rules for bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1897, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero, 2004. "A decent proposal," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 107-125, 07.
  3. Damme, Eric van, 1986. "The Nash bargaining solution is optimal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 78-100, February.
  4. Schummer, James & Thomson, William, 1997. "Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 333-337, September.
  5. Nir Dagan, 1994. "On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation," Economic theory and game theory 008, Nir Dagan, revised Feb 2008.
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  7. Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-266, March.
  8. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  9. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
  10. Young, H. P., 1987. "Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 203-214, March.
  11. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
  13. Sertel, Murat R., 1992. "The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 45-55, September.
  14. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2002. "Bankruptcy Rules And Progressive Taxation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  15. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 005, Nir Dagan.
  16. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
  17. Pfingsten, Andreas, 1991. "Surplus-sharing methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-301, June.
  18. del Carmen Marco Gil, M., 1995. "Efficient solutions for bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 57-69, August.
  19. Dagan, N. & Volij, O.C., 1994. "Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems," Discussion Paper 1994-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  20. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  21. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  22. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
  23. Herrero, Carmen & Marco, Maria Carmen, 1993. "Rational equal-loss solutions for bargaining problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 273-286, November.
  24. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  25. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72.
  26. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  27. Herrero, Carmen & Maschler, Michael & Villar, Antonio, 1999. "Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-77, January.
  28. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2002. "Sustainability in bankruptcy problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 10(2), pages 261-273, December.
  29. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June.
  30. Chun, Y. & Thomson, W., 1989. "Bargaining Problems With Claims," RCER Working Papers 189, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  31. Moulin Herve, 1984. "Egalitarianisme and utilitarianism in quasi-linear bargaining," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8417, CEPREMAP.
  32. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993. "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.
  33. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The proportional solution for rights problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 231-246, June.
  34. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  35. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
  36. Carmen Herrero Blanco & María del Carmen Marco Gil, 1992. "A note on the equal-loss principle for bargaining problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1992-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  37. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
  38. Marco Gil, Maria del Carmen, 1994. "An alternative characterization of the extended claim-egalitarian solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 41-46, May.
  39. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 103-106.
  40. Bergantinos, Gustavo & Sanchez, Estela, 2002. "The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 225-249, March.
  41. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
  42. Gale, David, 1974. "Exchange equilibrium and coalitions : An example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 63-66, March.
  43. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119.
  44. M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999. "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 255-272.
  45. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  46. Bossert, Walter, 1992. "Monotonic solutions for bargaining problems with claims," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 395-399, August.
  47. Chun, Youngsub & Peters, Hans, 1991. "The lexicographic equal-loss solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 151-161, October.
  48. Iain McLean (ed.), 1994. "Condorcet," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 309.
  49. Chambers, Christopher P. & Thomson, William, 2002. "Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 235-252, December.
  50. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Carmen Herrero Blanco & Giovanni Ponti, 2003. "An Experiment On Bankruptcy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  51. Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2001. "Additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 223-229.
  52. Casas-Mendez, B. & Borm, P.E.M. & Carpente, L. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2002. "The Constrained Equal Award Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions," Discussion Paper 2002-83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  53. Bossert, Walter, 1993. "An alternative solution to bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 205-220, May.
  54. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  55. Kaminski, Marek M., 2000. "'Hydraulic' rationing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 131-155, September.
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