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Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims

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  • Chambers, Christopher P.
  • Thomson, William

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  • Chambers, Christopher P. & Thomson, William, 2002. "Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 235-252, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:44:y:2002:i:3:p:235-252
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The proportional solution for rights problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 231-246, June.
    2. M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999. "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 255-272.
    3. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 217(1), pages 299-318, June.
    2. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2013. "Coalitional manipulation on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 627-662.
    3. Thomson, William & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2008. "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 177-198, November.
    4. Kasajima, Yoichi & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2010. "Non-proportional inequality preservation in gains and losses," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1079-1092, November.
    5. Kıbrıs, Özgür & Kıbrıs, Arzu, 2013. "On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 85-99.
    6. Ricardo Martínez, 2020. "On how to divide a budget according to population and wealth," ThE Papers 20/10, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    7. Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "Progressive and merging-proof taxation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 43-62, February.
    8. Jingyi Xue, 2018. "Fair division with uncertain needs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 105-136, June.
    9. Christopher P. Chambers & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2017. "Taxation and poverty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 153-175, January.
    10. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    11. René Brink & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2017. "The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 254(1), pages 449-465, July.
    12. William Thomson, 2014. "Compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules," RCER Working Papers 584, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    13. William Thomson, 2015. "For claims problems, compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 495-520, November.
    14. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
    15. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    16. Patrick Harless, 2017. "Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 755-781, March.
    17. Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Progressivity, Inequality Reduction, and Merging-Proofness in Taxation," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200603, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2006.
    18. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2004. "Coalitional Manipulation on Communication Network," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 563, Econometric Society.
    19. William Thomson, 2015. "For claims problems, another compromise between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules," RCER Working Papers 592, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

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