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Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

  • William Thomson

    (University of Rochester)

Registered author(s):

    A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems.

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    File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_578.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 578.

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    Length: 64 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:578
    Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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