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On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems

  • Özgür Kıbrıs


We propose and axiomatically analyze a class of rational solutions to simple allocation problems where a policy-maker allocates an endowment $$E$$ among $$n$$ agents described by a characteristic vector c. We propose a class of recursive rules which mimic a decision process where the policy-maker initially starts with a reference allocation of $$E$$ in mind and then uses the data of the problem to recursively adjust his previous allocation decisions. We show that recursive rules uniquely satisfy rationality, c-continuity, and other-c monotonicity. We also show that a well-known member of this class, the Equal Gains rule, uniquely satisfies rationality, c-continuity, and equal treatment of equals. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 75 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 449-463

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:75:y:2013:i:3:p:449-463
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9359-2
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